Way Out There in the Blue Reagan Star Wars and the End of the Cold War

Way Out There in the Blue is a major work of history by the Pulitzer Prize­winning author of Fire in the Lake. Using the Star Wars missile defense program as a magnifying glass on his presidency, Frances FitzGerald gives us a wholly original portrait of Ronald Reagan, the most puzzling president of the last half of the twentieth century.

Reagan’s presidency and the man himself have always been difficult to fathom. His influence was enormous, and the few powerful ideas he espoused remain with us still — yet he seemed nothing more than a charming, simple-minded, inattentive actor. FitzGerald shows us a Reagan far more complex than the man we thought we knew. A master of the American language and of self-presentation, the greatest storyteller ever to occupy the Oval Office, Reagan created a compelling public persona that bore little relationship to himself.

The real Ronald Reagan — the Reagan who emerges from FitzGerald’s book — was a gifted politician with a deep understanding of the American national psyche and at the same time an executive almost totally disengaged from the policies of his administration and from the people who surrounded him.

The idea that America should have an impregnable shield against nuclear weapons was Reagan’s invention. His famous Star Wars speech, in which he promised us such a shield and called upon scientists to produce it, gave rise to the Strategic Defense Initiative. Reagan used his sure understanding of American mythology, history and politics to persuade the country that a perfect defense against Soviet nuclear weapons would be possible, even though the technology did not exist and was not remotely feasible. His idea turned into a multibillion-dollar research program. SDI played a central role in U.S.-Soviet relations at a crucial juncture in the Cold War, and in a different form it survives to this day.

Drawing on prodigious research, including interviews with the participants, FitzGerald offers new insights into American foreign policy in the Reagan era. She gives us revealing portraits of major players in Reagan’s administration, including George Shultz, Caspar Weinberger, Donald Regan and Paul Nitze, and she provides a radically new view of what happened at the Reagan-Gorbachev summits in Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington and Moscow.

FitzGerald describes the fierce battles among Reagan’s advisers and the frightening increase of Cold War tensions during Reagan’s first term. She shows how the president who presided over the greatest peacetime military buildup came to espouse the elimination of nuclear weapons, and how the man who insisted that the Soviet Union was an “evil empire” came to embrace the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, and to proclaim an end to the Cold War long before most in Washington understood that it had ended.

Way Out There in the Blue is a ground-breaking history of the American side of the end of the Cold War. Both appalling and funny, it is a black comedy in which Reagan, playing the role he wrote for himself, is the hero.

User Ratings and Reviews

1 Star Poorly written and ideologically biased
Of all the books written on the Reagan administration, this one may be one of the worst. Poorly written with excessive attention to detail that makes the story plod, it makes one wonder if Frances Fitzgerald was a one hit wonder. Fitzgerald’s portrayal of Reagan as out of step with reality - starting with the book title and included throughout its content - is less of a description of reality and more, I suspect, the blowing off of ideological steam. If you despise Reagan and think he was a dunderhead this book will do more than reinforce those beliefs. If you want an intelligent and useful discussion of the Reagan Administration and its foreign policy walk right past this one.

1 Star Terrible Book
It what amounts to nothing more then an attack by a leftist writer, Fitzgeralds focus is to demean the charcater of a great president. Weather he was a bumbling … or was just acting, like in his movies, fitzgerald argument does not deal with the fact that when Ronald Reagan entered office the Cold War had never been colder, and by the time he left office it was essentialy over. Was it a matter of luck that the collapse of the Soviet Empire occured on the watch of the most anti-communist president in the history of the country? Fitzgerald can theorize anything she/he pleases, but ask the Russians what impact Star Wars had on their demise.

3 Stars First-rate scholarship and second-rate understanding
The major merits of Fitzgreald’s dense tome is that it undeniably calls to attention perhaps the most blatantly misguided policy of the Reagan years–SDI, “Star Wars”, the anti-nuclear missile defense system that cost the taxpayers billions and failed to deliver. Reagan partially concieved and spearheaded the admirable goal of breaking the deadlock MAD [mutually assured destruction] had on U.S.-Soviet relations. Despite Reagan’s vision, or maybe because of it, SDI was an unmitigated failure. Fitzgerald highlights Reagan’s hands-off approach to his cabinet, which lead to massive problems and came close to destroying his reputation when Iran-Contra broke. Why, then, with such a tight grasp of these particular concepts and the researched facts to back them up, is Fitzgerald’s book less than perfect?
For one thing, the reader doesn’t get the whole story on a number of points. Had Fitzgerald restricted her focus entirely to SDI the book would be nearly flawless. However, she’s intent on showing how Reagan’s dedication to SDI is related to other less-than-perfect incidents in his administration. And so we get the financial wiz-kid and architect of the miserable supply-side “Reaganomics” David Stockman being portrayed as a hapless bystander to Reagan’s barrage of indifference (Lou Cannon demonstrates otherwise). Don Regen is shown to be screwed over by Reagan’s indifference (Edmund Morris sets the record straight in this regard). Sure, Reagan did often give off the impression of indifference, whether or not he was so. It is simplifaction to say that Reagan just didn’t care, though.
The intense, limited scope of Fitzgerald’s research shows through in other areas. Henry Kissinger’s seemingly irrational support of SDI makes no sense without knowledge of Nixon’s Safeguard plan in the 70s, where Nixon and Kissinger–much like some of Reagan’s aids hoped to do with SDI–started an ABM system program in order to bargain it away with the Soviets.

Fitzgerald’s work is valuable but only in context with other works studying Reagan and his legacy. The casual reader interested in the how and why of Reagan should look elsewhere and come back here only after learning more background.

1 Star Me think Book good
Me think book good. LIberals smart, conservatives dumb, me think liberals better then Regan, stoopid Regan, not smart like liBarels, Francies Fitsjerald smart, jest like cuzzin in Arkansaw who maried sister, liBiarals smart.

4 Stars Disillusionment
The JCS would never accept an arms reduction without a space defense program. The JCS goal was keep SDI in research avoiding deployment and increase interceptor missile deployment. The doctrine of deterrence would could through the twenth century.

The Reagan administration gave the Bush administration an unique opportunity to reduce arms. The Bush administration did not continue the Reagan administrations views on foreign policy with Gorbachev. The Bush administration would stop and the continuation of the Reagan summits ceased and Bush would contemplate the previous administrations philosophy and direction with disagreement. The Bush administration would take a broad interpretation of the ABM. The transition between the Reagan and the Bush administration would treat the ARM reduction opportunity like a hostile take over, replacing Shultz and Weinberger with Bush people, and resume deterrence buildup policy. Bush’s differed in his view of foreign policy, not willing to take Reagan’s hardline position. Bush felt Reagan’s hardline rhethoric was offensive to the Soviet leadership. Reagan had openly challenged Gorbachev on issues of human rights condemning the violence. Reagan called the Soviet Union the “evil empire”. Reagan’s hardline position postured the United States as one of military strength, 3 to 4 percent increases for SDI, and a estimated cost of 1.6 trillion dollars to deploy SDI; inconsistency in reporting and engineering feasiblity of the chemical and X-Ray laser brightness (Daniel Graham and Teller) as a military weapon; economic drives to reduce military spending, balance the budget, and reduce inflation. Reagan’s NORAD vision prompted his to dream of a defensive system capable of making the Soviet ICBM impotent eliminating the potential of first strike. Reagan realized “Mutal Assured Destruction” did not stop a first strike response, it only deterred; and with the Soviets considering the possiblity of winning a nuclear war, defensive missile systems needed to be engineered and deployed immediately. Moscow media was warning of the possiblity of U.S first strike. The fear was caused more by a pattern of military buildup than an particular doctrine. The nuclear arms races of the cold war positioned the U.S in a potential first strike position. ARM reduction talks were a mandatory must.

Gorbachev as General Secretary was considered trustworthy, known as “incorruptable and courageous”, by Soviet leadership too secure Soviet communist interests and start reform leading too social and economic structural revolution of the soviet union paving a pathway for Marxist views of property rights, freedom of press and speech, primary elections, openings for foreign investment and transplating of foreign companies, free markets and free trade, and the arms reduction. Gorbachev would raise to the status and power of President. Boris Yeltsin was critical of Gorbachev. Gorbachev would not be able to break from Russia’s totalitarian past. Yeltsin would be eventually elected as president. Yeltsin would struggle with reform against the hardliners and failing expectations of previous era’s. Yeltsin would face the struggle to a market economy: failure of taxation, hyper inflation shock to lifting price controls, and problems with stablizing privatization.
Gorbachev received a standing obviation from the U.N. after a fifteen year soviet absence caused by Brezhnev condemning speech against the U.N. Gorbachev seemed different from other Soviet leadership and Margret Thatcher seemed to agree. Gorbachev return to the U.N signals a change in Soviet strategy. The strategy did not deviate from the goal of world domination.
Gorbachev proposed an unique idea, “the complete destruction of all nuclear weapons by 2000″ and social change for the Soviet Union. This vision would make Gorbachev, man of the year, according to Times news. The reduction of 50,000 missiles. Was the offer pragmatic and realistic? Reagan never did buy into a 100 percent arms reduction nor believe in negotiate from a position of weakness. Reagan had forced the confrontation by building up the NATO missile arsenal.
The soviet military economy was bankrupt and the financial drain at a crisis level, social change was inevitable: the actual missile growth rate was lower than Soviet Analyst had originally reported, Soviet satelite terrorities conflicts could not be assured intervention, and Gorbachev would start Perestroika changing the face of communism. “Perestroika stimulate human initiative and creativity within the Leninist/Stalinist paradigm.” Reagan exploited this weakeness and put the U.S in an unique negotiating position.
Reagan spoke to students at the Moscow University telling them they were part of a great change in their country and had the responsibility to ensure the change was successful. The U.S Soviet talks started at the same time: the Iran-Contra scandal with North and Ponidexter (arms/drugs for hostages); and the Chernobyl disaster forcing the evacuation of a hundred thousand people.
Reagan, Collin Powell, and Shultz formed a tight negiotating team advising Reagan on tactics and strategy during talks with Gorbachev. Shultz work with Sheverdnadze opened up allowed talks to open between the two countries. Powell was very aware of Gorbachev’s skill in debate and couched Reagan on counter tactics: more one on one private discussion, type double space notes for Reagan to follow, and maintaining control of the conversation. Gorbachev was a tough negiotator, who knew his facts and Soviet interests and he came prepared and should not be under-estimated.

Reagan hardline rhetoric, love for America, and empathy put him one of the most unique negotiating positions in the world history: the position of achieve a realistic arms reduction. Eventually, Gorbachev would propose over a 1400 soviet missile and 429 U.S missile reduction and the beginning of START and condition SDI to stay in research phase only. The proposal could not be accepted. SDI research would continue through the Bush administration into the Clinton administration. The Clinton administration would provide the greatest chances for SDI deployment. Other deteriant missile types were conceived, such as small and light smart missile providing a defensive shield from space that cost hundreds of thousand of dollars rather than millions. The greatest challenge to the ABM technology was that Soviets missile changed from liquid fuel to solid fuel causing and increased variance in speed, obsoleting missile interceptor technology. Continual adaptions in Soviet missile technology threaten the security confidence.

The nuclear threat has not gone away. Topol M under the ABM treaty again challenges our perception of a defensive shield against an adaptive missile technology capable of confusing satelite tracking and mid flight navigational variation designed to avoid destruction by ground interceptor missiles. The need for defensive missile is as real today as in Reagan’s era.

Other personality discussed in the Book were Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Weinberger, Meese, and Baker.

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