The Reagan Reversal Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War

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4 Stars Very interesting and informative
I’ve never been a Reagan fan, but Beth Fischer portrays this former president in a way that explicates Reagan’s many complexities. Essentially, Fischer debunks the myth that Reagan was an ignorant and passive president. While, he did make his share of mistakes, especially in foreign policy, Fischer nevertheless, argues the leader-driven theory. She supports this assertion by attributing the reversal in American policy toward the Soviet Union solely on Reagan. By the same token, she blames Reagan for the belligerent and hawkish approach America took toward the Soviet Union in the early 1980s. She does not, however, ignore the part that anti-Soviet hardliners such as Weinberger and Richard Perle played in forming Soviet policy. Instead, Fischer argues that Reagan played the determing factor within the National Security Planning Group, which was responsible for forming American foreign policy. Specifically, this committee was split down the middle by two factions. On the one hand, there was Schultz and his coalition, which supported a conciliatory approach toward the Soviet Union in addition to favouring arms control. On the other hand, there was Weinberger and Perle who charged the Soviets with the intention of conspiring to military and strategic superiority. In addition, she cites the Iran-contra affair as one of the many examples in which Reagan played a dynamic role in forming foreign policy. After all, this affair went against the good sense of his advisers. And the Strategic Defence Initiative was definitely a presidential initiatve. More importantly, Fischer argues that the turning point in Soviet-American relations was not set into motion by the Soviets, but by Reagan. She pinpoints the Able Archer 83 incident as the point where Reagan realized that his aggressive stance might precipitate a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Moreover, this occured near the end of 1983, whereas many other analysts argue that Gorbachev (who came into power in 1985) was responsible for decreasing tensions between the two superpowers.

Conversely, Fischer’s analysis cannot help by highlight some of Reagan’s political mishaps. He did indeed seem to be a well-intentioned, but uninformed loose cannon. SDI wasn’t as well received as he might have liked it because he failed to consult the scientific community save for Edward Teller and people loyal to his vision. In addition, he failed to consult America’s NATO allies, whose very existence depended on the existing nuclear strategy of MAD. Moreover, the Administration was somewhat confused and lacking cohesion with regard to SDI because the president failed to consult the DOD and the State Department. For instance, Fischer points out how Reagan did not even notify Schultz until two days before his speech and as for the rest of his cabinet, they found out the day of. Furthermore, his spontaneity, or so it seemed to be, caused him to make promises or suggestions which contradicted the very essence of SDI. For example, he insinuated that the United States might share SDI technologies with Europe and the Soviet Union. However, he initiated SDI because it was something the United States could do unilateraly. Moreover, he later said that he would not give anyone the veto over SDI, which defeated the purpose of multilateral sharing.

While, I have gone on for long enough about “the Reagan Reversal,” I must say that this is a well researched piece of work and more importantly, it was a pleasure to read.

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